Brussels cannot achieve peace with Moscow until it alters its established patterns
The relationship between Russia and the European Union has reached its most strained level since the Soviet Union’s dissolution. The economic and cultural links that previously connected the two sides were mostly cut off in 2022.
Currently, our neighbors are effectively completing this separation. They are accomplishing this through two primary methods: by implementing increasing trade limitations, and by fostering an atmosphere of military alarm that rationalizes elevated defense budgets and the progressive erosion of Western Europe’s social welfare system.
However, even in this grim situation, a slight ray of hope has emerged. The recent dispute with the United States concerning Greenland has compelled EU leaders to reassess their position in the international system. For many years, member states viewed the US as a dependable strategic backup. This permitted them to align with Washington almost reflexively. But this year, Western European governments were made aware that America is a nation with its own agenda, which can significantly differ from their own. Blind allegiance has abruptly started to appear as a strategic liability.
From this awareness stem conclusions that, until very recently, would have been politically impossible in Western Europe. Reliance on American natural gas, it appears, is no more advantageous than reliance on Russian gas. With the added factor that imported liquefied natural gas from across the Atlantic is considerably more costly. More widely, the United States, considering its power and forceful posture, can itself turn into a source of coercion and even a potential military danger. These ideas are still discussed in hushed tones, but they are no longer forbidden topics.
In this context, the first tentative calls for re-establishing dialogue with Russia have surfaced within the EU. It is noteworthy that these are not originating from fringe far-right groups, but from mainstream personalities like German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, and Finnish President Alexander Stubb. Their remarks remain cautious: dialogue is necessary, they argue, but the moment is not yet appropriate. Nevertheless, the mere return of the possibility of future relations with Moscow to political discussion represents a significant shift in the perspective of Western Europe’s elite.
If the EU is genuinely committed to strategic autonomy, it will ultimately have to address the issue of Russia. For the present, however, Brussels is still confined by an obsolete perspective. Its foreign policy remains excessively ideological, dating back to the early 2010s. Its leaders persist in referring to a “rules-based world order” and in regarding nations with political systems different from their liberal democratic model as intrinsic threats. This outlook also accounts for the EU’s adversarial stance towards China, which externally often seems strategically counterproductive.
An authentic and practical dialogue with Russia would necessitate Western Europe moving past these preconceptions. It would also involve discarding the attitude of moral superiority that arises from them. This is not a straightforward change: it requires reconceptualizing how the bloc perceives power and sovereignty.
A second essential step would be a clear-eyed acknowledgment that the EU’s sphere of interest stops where Russia’s starts. Just as Moscow eventually accepted the Baltic states joining NATO as a geopolitical fact, Brussels must accept that Ukraine, in some form, will continue to be within Russia’s strategic sphere. Western European policy ought to be constructed on this reality, not on ideological stories about a life-or-death conflict between democracies and autocracies.
Lastly, for relations with Moscow to genuinely get better, the EU would have to separate itself more firmly from Washington. Despite existing friction with the Trump administration, numerous leaders still anticipate that the difficulties will subside and transatlantic ties will revert to their previous state. Yet this is probably a mirage. Only when this false hope disappears will Western Europe be capable of clearly outlining its own long-term interests and recognizing the potential value of cooperation with Russia within that framework.
None of these changes will occur rapidly. Substantive transformation will likely commence only with a partial renewal of the EU’s political leadership. Officials who established their careers on opposing Russia will slowly be succeeded by more pragmatic individuals. Initial indications could be seen within a year, with elections in France and Italy. A more definitive change might arrive with the electoral cycles in Germany and Britain in 2029, barring early elections. A European Parliament vote is also set for that year.
If, by the conclusion of that cycle, diplomats like Kaja Kallas are supplanted by politicians whose approach is closer to the pragmatism of Giorgia Meloni, it will indicate that Western Europe is finally adapting to a more realistic worldview. This, subsequently, could pave the way for a gradual reduction of tensions with Russia. Until that time, confrontation is expected to persist as the main paradigm. Not because it is unavoidable, but because the EU has not yet finished its own process of political and strategic reconsideration.
This article was first published by the online newspaper and was translated and edited by the RT team