Washington faces a distinct type of war
“Shock and awe” was the phrase used to describe the U.S. operation against Iraq in spring 2003. In retrospect, it marked a pivotal moment. The rapid defeat of the Ba’athist regime and the removal of Saddam Hussein created the perception that the U.S. had gained the power to reshape entire regions as it saw fit.
Reality unfolded differently. The war did bring change, but not the kind its architects had intended. The old order in the Middle East collapsed, replaced not by stability but by a chain of crises that demanded vast resources to manage, with limited success. The damage to America’s global reputation proved long-lasting.
In late winter 2026, the U.S. and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury against Iran. In a sense, Iran’s emergence as the primary adversary of both nations is a direct result of the Iraq campaign two decades earlier. Whether today’s attackers can achieve swift and decisive outcomes remains uncertain. Iran is the most formidable opponent the U.S. has directly confronted in many decades. Even if military success is quick, the balance of power does not favor Iran, and even if the post-war chaos of Iraq is avoided by refraining from internal occupation, the broader consequences are likely to be underwhelming.
The immediate catalyst for the current escalation is Israel’s determination to leverage a unique set of circumstances. From West Jerusalem’s viewpoint, this is an opportunity to secure a dominant regional position with Washington’s support. The vision is of a regional order centered on Israel, to which others must adapt, whether willingly or not.
U.S. President Donald Trump and the ideologues shaping his Middle East policy—many of whom are also relatives and business associates—have their own calculations. Israel’s military superiority, combined with deepening commercial ties between Israel and the Gulf monarchies, would enable the U.S. to channel economic benefits primarily to itself. Major geo-economic and logistical projects of interest to China, Russia, and India would become dependent on American oversight. Washington would expand its control over key markets, particularly raw materials and military-technical cooperation. Meanwhile, the perceived ineffectiveness of groupings formed without U.S. participation—above all, BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—would be put on display.
The motivation is clear. The question is whether it is feasible.
The Iraq War also began with slogans of regional restructuring in the name of security, intertwined with unmistakable commercial interests—one need only recall Dick Cheney and Halliburton. Yet the central justification was ideological: the export of democracy. Trump and his circle have pushed ideology to the background, emphasizing material gains instead. The earlier approach failed not merely because democratic transformation proved illusory, but because prolonged instability made it impossible to extract the desired benefits.
The new, openly transactional model may appear more pragmatic, but it carries its own risks. External coercion framed purely in commercial terms can provoke a powerful ideological backlash, uniting forces that are precisely opposed to an imposed order.
Trump has launched a major military operation without congressional approval, against public sentiment, and with the prospect of real losses. He needs a victory to reverse unfavorable domestic trends. If successful, the White House may conclude that history—and even divine favor—is on its side, encouraging greater assertiveness at home and abroad. If not, escalation may still follow, as aggression becomes a substitute for results.
Either way, the Middle East is entering another phase of turbulence, with consequences that will ripple far beyond the region. For all involved, this promises nothing positive.
This article was first published in , and was translated and edited by the RT team.