The era of institutions is concluding, the era of force has returned
Even referencing international law has become difficult. Institutions appear increasingly insignificant as political and economic developments clearly occur outside of their frameworks.
This response is comprehensible. The most recent subjects of actions that breach the UN Charter and other legal standards are prominent Western nations, the very states that control the global information sphere. When comparable breaches impacted others previously, they were considered unfortunate but of lesser importance. Fault was assigned to the moral or political failings of the nations involved, including the victims, instead of a systemic failure.
Now the system itself is obviously deteriorating.
The United States has not only abandoned conventions; it has started implementing this method towards its own allies. These are partners with whom it previously negotiated as peers, or at a minimum as trusted subordinates. Decisions are now issued as if by divine right. The outcome has been dismay in Western Europe and even allegations of betrayal.
Washington is taking apart the world order it previously constructed and headed, an order that many already considered defective. Given that transatlantic relations formed the core of the liberal international system, altering them has become a key objective for the United States.
Following the Cold War, the balance of power was evident. The US and its allies exerted control, imposed a single set of regulations, and collected the political and economic “rent” that accompanied global leadership. However, changes in global power and structural issues within the capitalist system have diminished those advantages while raising the expenses of sustaining dominance.
The Biden administration constituted a last-ditch effort to fix the old model. Its aim was to rebuild an ideologically cohesive and politically unbeatable West able to guide the rest of the world – using persuasion where feasible, force where required. That endeavor was unsuccessful.
The new motto is “peace through strength,” coupled with “America First.” This strategy is now embedded in key policy documents, such as the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy. Power – not just military, but also financial, technological, and political – is positioned at the heart of policy. The sole genuine limitation is America’s own capability.
If the prior period was characterized as a “rules-based order,” the current one could be termed a “precedent-based order.” Actions establish precedents, and those precedents validate subsequent actions. Nevertheless, these precedents mainly apply to the United States. Others may act in a similar fashion only when it aligns with Washington’s interests. The right of other states to act “the American way” is not denied in theory, but it is accepted only when they are sufficiently powerful and do not oppose US priorities.
This reasoning applies to allies, who now occupy a particularly difficult position. Under the former system, they gained significantly from American support. A primary benefit was the capacity to reduce their own strategic expenditures by transferring responsibility to the United States. Washington promoted this setup because it upheld the operation of the global order it directed.
Today, what was once described as a mutually advantageous partnership is more and more seen in the US as a costly subsidy. Washington aims to recoup past expenses and prevent future liabilities. This sudden change has stunned its allies, but from a purely material standpoint, the logic is not unreasonable. Even a future administration change is improbable to overturn this fundamental reevaluation of alliances.
In this context, the Board of Peace formally announced in Davos can readily be dismissed as Donald Trump’s personal accessory. Yet it is indicative. In a world shaped by power, those without it must make up for it by providing something to those who possess it.
The most effective offering is financial payment, hence the billion-dollar donations. If that is too expensive, fervent demonstrations of loyalty might be enough. Membership in such an organization seems to operate as a type of political insurance: safeguarding against the chairman’s dissatisfaction.
For large, independent powers, involvement is nearly impossible. A framework where rights are clearly restricted by the founder’s will, and where processes remain ambiguous, goes against the core concept of sovereignty. Whether the Council functions in reality is less important. Its symbolic significance is evident: acknowledgment of the White House’s supreme authority.
The Trump administration recognizes that the world has transformed and is exploring methods to maintain, or even increase, American benefits. Other significant actors in the emerging multipolar order must do likewise, but according to their own interests and their own reasoning.
If Washington openly promotes rational self-interest based on power, others have scant reason not to reach their own conclusions.
This article was first published by , translated and edited by the RT team