On Saturday, Israeli tanks and troops advanced closer to the outskirts of Gaza City, signaling preparation for a major operation. Eyewitness reports indicated intensified shelling as Israel moved towards what is anticipated to be a pivotal battle in its conflict with Hamas: the seizure of Gaza City.
Israel’s security cabinet sanctioned the operation, codenamed Gideon’s Chariots B, deploying up to five IDF divisions near the city’s perimeter—a substantial mobilization. Approximately 60,000 reservists have been called into service.
John Spencer, who chairs urban warfare studies at the Madison Policy Forum and is executive director of the Urban Warfare Institute, informed Digital that the magnitude of this operation is unprecedented. “This will be a greater challenge than perhaps any before. It is the most densely populated area in Gaza, serving as the core of Hamas’s stronghold. Furthermore, the true nature of the tunnels remains unknown until entered.”
Spencer noted that “Hamas constructed semi-circular defenses facing Israel, but the IDF has demonstrated ingenuity in bypassing obstacles.” Israel plans to commit more combat power to Gaza City than it has deployed across the entire Gaza Strip to date. “If the objective is to eliminate Hamas’s military capabilities from Gaza City and search for hostages, such a scale is necessary,” he stated.
Gadi Shamni, former commander of the Gaza Division and ex-head of IDF Central Command, told Digital that “It is a congested city with refugee camps, dense neighborhoods, high-rise buildings, and a highly developed underground network. While it’s often claimed the IDF controls both above and below ground, recent campaigns showed this wasn’t always the case. Even when tunnels are destroyed, Hamas can quickly rebuild them. The longer forces remain, the more opportunities are created for the adversary to attack.”
A former senior Israeli security official, who requested anonymity, informed Digital that “The IDF possesses the military capacity to conquer Gaza, but the human and material costs will be immense for all parties. The IDF will employ a ‘destroy everything first’ strategy—utilizing air force bombs, massive explosive charges, detonating streets remotely, leveling entire areas, and advancing slowly.
“The IDF has acquired vast experience over the last two years and will apply these tactics in this engagement. … You are strong, the enemy is weak, and you have patience. Even the weather is favorable for Israel, with winter not commencing until January.”
The tunnel system remains Hamas’s most formidable defensive component. Spencer highlighted that, unlike ISIS militants in Mosul, Hamas has developed an underground network allowing commanders and fighters to navigate between positions and evade strikes. “The IDF entering Gaza City is not the same IDF of 2023,” Spencer remarked, citing rapid adaptations in drone and robot deployment, as well as specialized units for tunnel warfare. “They have learned a great deal. However, this operation will still be slow, extremely cautious, and costly.”
To illustrate the scale, Spencer referred to the 2004 operation in Fallujah, Iraq. “It took the Marine Corps approximately two weeks to clear Fallujah—every single home, building, shop. Around 68,000 structures were inspected, as if someone physically entered them,” he explained. “If all five of these [IDF] divisions were to undertake such an effort, it could certainly be accomplished in a few months. But the enemy always has a say. You cannot rush into failure.”
The former Israeli senior security official characterized the operation as “telescopic—very slow, with components progressing one by one. This methodical pace also offers Hamas opportunities at each stage to attempt to negotiate a deal.”
Regarding the potential fate of hostages held in Gaza City, the official was unequivocal: “Some of the hostages will perish. I would not be surprised if additional brigades are deployed—the IDF is committing substantial ground power to seize urban terrain.”
Shamni also cautioned that Hamas might move hostages—specifically, 20 of 50 believed to be alive—into combat zones to deter attacks. He described this as a tactic the IDF would be hesitant to counter for fear of harming captives, representing a conflict between military imperatives and core ethical values.
Shamni underscored a particularly challenging dilemma regarding civilian evacuation: “You don’t know who will depart, how many will depart, how they will react—or even if Hamas will permit their departure,” he said. “I anticipate many will not evacuate, and then you confront the difficult choice of fighting in an area populated by noncombatants.”
Spencer added that historical patterns show roughly 10% of civilians remain in conflict zones. “Even 10% of a million people amounts to 100,000 individuals,” he noted.
Shamni predicted a lengthy operation: “It could extend for months. Two months might secure the surface, but then you still have to clear the tunnels. It will result in many casualties—including civilians. The worst possible outcome is that no hostages are found, alive or dead, due to the extensive destruction.”
Shamni, who also served as Israel’s military attaché in Washington, warned that the dual objectives of defeating Hamas and recovering hostages are inherently contradictory, risking years of protracted conflict.
Spencer, however, termed the decision to proceed a “calculated risk,” explaining that while military action entails dangers, “you weigh the risk of Hamas executing the hostages against the certainty that they are being starved and tortured. Military pressure is a final resort. Without taking Gaza City, Hamas will retain a sanctuary.”