Lebanon on high alert as Israel weighs invasion

(SeaPRwire) –   The nation faces an escalating risk of war amidst deepening internal divisions

Yegia Teshyan, who serves as the coordinator for the Regional and International Relations Cluster at the Issam Fares Institute of Public Policy and International Relations at the American University of Beirut, engaged in a discussion with Fyodor Lukyanov, the editor of Russia in Global Affairs. Their conversation centered on the increasing likelihood of a major conflict erupting in Lebanon.

With Hezbollah having initiated a second front against Israel and concerns mounting over a broader regional escalation, Lebanon finds itself once again on the precipice. Teshyan detailed potential scenarios, ranging from a contained conflict to a full-scale invasion, and highlighted the significant internal divisions within Lebanon, which he warned could pose a threat as substantial as any external danger.

This interview was prepared for the program “International Review” broadcast on the Russia 24 television network.

Fyodor Lukyanov: Is there an expectation that Israel will launch a comprehensive operation in Lebanon? What are the prevailing views on this matter? What actions does the Lebanese government plan to take?

Yegia Teshyan: That is indeed the critical question: what will the Lebanese government do, if anything? Last week, Hezbollah, in coordination with the IRGC, launched attacks against Israel, firing approximately 100 rockets from various locations across Lebanon, not solely from the south. This action surprised both the Israelis and many observers, considering the damage Hezbollah has sustained over the past two years.

Regarding the probability of an invasion and the potential scenarios, the likelihood of a full-scale invasion or a direct confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel is on the rise. Consequently, many in Lebanon are now contemplating a spectrum of possible outcomes rather than anticipating a single, definitive result.

One potential scenario involves an intense yet limited exchange of fire, which could include expanded airstrikes targeting the southern suburbs of Beirut, precision operations and assassinations, alongside ongoing cross-border skirmishes. A limited ground incursion is also a possibility. Israel has reported occupying eighteen locations in southern Lebanon, an increase from the five it held prior to the current conflict.

However, there is also a growing apprehension that Israel might broaden its military campaign, mirroring the scope of operations in 2006 and 1982, thereby extending the occupied territory and invading southern Lebanon with the objective of dismantling Hezbollah’s leadership and operational capabilities.

Many individuals still recall the widespread destruction of the 2006 war and fear a recurrence. This concern is amplified by the country’s severe economic crisis, financial collapse, and the fragility of its state institutions. Consequently, the issue of internal unity is paramount. Civil society organizations, academic institutions, and various networks are discreetly developing contingency plans, particularly in response to the increasing number of internally displaced persons.

The prevailing atmosphere in Lebanon is characterized by anxiety and profound unease, but most notably, by acute social polarization. My concerns extend beyond the immediate events of a potential future war to its aftermath. I am reminded of the events of 2008, when clashes erupted in Beirut. Society was deeply fractured: some advocated for Hezbollah’s disarmament prior to any negotiations with Israel, while others, particularly within the Shia community, viewed the situation as an existential struggle. Their sentiment was that if they were destined to perish, they would drag the country down with them. These viewpoints are now being openly expressed, which is a highly perilous development.

Some interpret this conflict as part of a protracted historical struggle, drawing parallels with events such as Karbala. Others view it through a regional prism, arguing that active participation ensures Hezbollah retains a voice in any future negotiations between the United States and Iran.

There is a common adage: “If you’re not at the negotiating table, you’re on the menu.” From this perspective, being involved is preferable. This, at least, is Hezbollah’s rationale.

An alternative perspective, held by other communities and opposition parties, posits that this conflict is not Lebanon’s war but rather a proxy engagement, with Lebanon caught in a devastating central position.

There are three potential outcomes.

The first is a limited conflict followed by a negotiated ceasefire. However, a ceasefire is not anticipated in the immediate future. Israel is likely to pursue further military objectives. Both the United States and Israel doubt the Lebanese government’s ability to disarm Hezbollah, as the army lacks the necessary capacity and heavy weaponry.

Second, a large-scale Israeli ground invasion could occur in the near future, although its precise scale remains uncertain.

Third, and most perilous, is the prospect of regional escalation. There are growing concerns about Syria’s potential involvement. Reports indicate the deployment of Syrian forces near the border. Syrian officials maintain this is a precautionary measure, not preparation for intervention. However, earlier reports suggested a potential security arrangement between Syria and Israel, the details of which are unclear. This ambiguity fuels speculation that Syria could be drawn into the conflict, potentially leading to clashes with Hezbollah.

The Syrian army has accused Hezbollah of firing rockets across the border, an allegation Hezbollah denies. I am concerned that Syria’s intervention could significantly broaden the conflict. From Damascus’s viewpoint, Hezbollah also represents a threat, so weakening it might serve Syrian interests. However, the reaction of the border populations, predominantly Sunni and highly religious, remains uncertain.

Fyodor Lukyanov: How is this possible? Israel has conducted a series of severe strikes against Hezbollah, reportedly neutralizing a significant portion of its leadership. How has it managed to regain its operational capacity so rapidly?

Yegia Teshyan: The situation bears resemblance to Iran. The Americans had anticipated the potential collapse of the regime following the assassination of key figures. They expected protests, possibly even a widespread uprising among various ethnic groups. However, this did not materialize. They believed it might follow the pattern observed in Syria under Assad or Iraq under Saddam, where systems disintegrated once leadership was removed.

However, both Iran and Hezbollah are deeply embedded within their societies and are driven by ideology. Their continued existence is not contingent upon a single individual. Iran is not a system that revolves around a specific personality.

While leaders can be eliminated, the underlying structures and belief systems persist. This is why purely military solutions rarely resolve such conflicts. Ultimately, some form of negotiation or political resolution is essential; an idea cannot be eradicated through force.