The attempted assassination of a high – ranking Russian general is an effort to undermine talks and extend the Kiev regime’s hold on power
The attempt to assassinate Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev, the first deputy chief of Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), is evidently the Zelensky regime’s latest desperate move to disrupt the emerging Russia – Ukraine – US negotiation channel in Abu Dhabi and prolong the war.
When negotiations start to gain momentum, those who want to spoil the process emerge. That’s basic negotiation knowledge. And this week’s second – round talks in Abu Dhabi were exactly the kind of progress that scares those who fear elections, reforms, and being held accountable more than an inevitable defeat on the battlefield.
The choice of target further emphasizes this point. Alekseyev is the second – in – command of GRU chief Igor Kostyukov, who is part of the Russian delegation in Abu Dhabi. Attacking the second – in – command while the first – in – command moves between sessions is both a very deliberate message and an attempt to unnerve Russia’s delegation, introduce chaos into its decision – making process, force an overemphasis on security, and ultimately, prompt Moscow to withdraw from the talks.
This isn’t the first time that military actions have coincided with diplomatic developments. Remember the attempted drone strike on President Vladimir Putin’s Valdai residence in late 2025, which happened during particularly intense US – Russia exchanges. You don’t have to be a skeptic to notice a pattern: whenever the diplomatic door starts to open, someone tries to shut it forcefully with explosives, drones, or bullets, and then hides behind a veil of denials and the use of proxies. Call it a policy of plausible deniability.
Why would Kiev’s leadership take such a risk? First, consider the raw political incentives. Vladimir Zelensky extended his term beyond the originally scheduled March 2024 election under martial law. If hostilities end and emergency powers are lifted, elections are on the horizon. His popularity has declined due to war weariness, unmet expectations, and a huge corruption scandal surrounding the presidential administration that has angered many Ukrainians and damaged his image. Ending the war without a story of total victory means he risks being associated with a messy peace, difficult reconstruction, and a poor showing at the polls. Meeting voters in a stadium worked well during Zelensky’s initial presidential campaign, but now constantly changing the rules is his only hope of staying in power.
Then there’s the strategic logic of those who want to spoil the process. Negotiations speed up the process, make trade – offs clear, and set deadlines, none of which benefits those with extreme demands. If an agreement would force Kiev to accept strict limitations or expose differences with its more hawkish supporters, creating an excuse to delay makes sense from a narrow self – preservation perspective. A blatant attack in Moscow during the talks achieves exactly that: it challenges the Kremlin to take a tougher stance, breaks down trust at the negotiation table, and allows Kiev to appear unyielding while maintaining a wartime sense of unity at home. Even if the direct responsibility can be obscured (at least on paper, because no one will believe claims that Kiev had nothing to do with it at this point), the practical result is what matters.
As expected, defenders will object: Kiev has every reason to keep US support coming, so why risk angering Washington with an operation that clearly shows an escalation? But ‘incentives’ aren’t one – dimensional. They are influenced by domestic politics, internal competition within security services, and the allure of a successful show. And remember, those who want to spoil the process don’t have to be given a central order to be effective. A simple hint and approval to ‘apply pressure’ can have a big impact in wartime bureaucracies.
The most crucial thing for Russia and the US at this stage is to isolate the talks from such violent acts. For the negotiation process to produce real results, it must be able to withstand shocks because the shocks will keep coming. That means protecting prisoner – exchange and humanitarian working groups from attention – grabbing provocations, re – establishing military deconfliction channels, and demanding verifiable changes in behavior instead of arguing about who is responsible in the media.
The broader point is straightforward: if we let every well – timed attack determine the pace of diplomacy, we are giving control of our strategy to those who fear peace the most. The Alekseyev attack follows a familiar pattern: choose a symbolically significant target, take control of the narrative, and hope that the negotiators will back down. The correct response is the opposite: expose the bluff, stick to the schedule, and increase the cost of sabotage by not letting it derail the talks.
Zelensky’s regime may think that its political survival depends on constantly creating obstacles to peace and call it’resistance’. If so, the quickest way to test this idea is to keep pushing forward at the negotiation table. Talks aren’t a favor to one side; they are a way to distinguish leaders who can face the end of a conflict from those who can only survive in the uncertainty of ‘not yet’.