US retreat from Iran will not be forgotten by its allies

(SeaPRwire) –   Washington prioritizes self-preservation, a fact now widely recognized

What will be the repercussions for the United States following its decision to refrain from taking extreme actions against Iran?

It is premature to determine the lasting regional order that may emerge in the Middle East after the unsuccessful campaign by the US and Israel against Tehran. However, the choice to avoid escalation, and consequently the destruction of an entire civilization, already permits several conclusions, not only regarding the region but also concerning the broader direction of global politics.

Firstly, this situation once again highlights the limitations of superpower influence when vital interests are not directly threatened. Secondly, international politics continues to move in a perilous direction, where the potential for a widespread military catastrophe remains a constant possibility. Furthermore, this trend shows no immediate signs of abating.

Once it became evident that Washington could not overcome Iran’s resistance or compel it to reopen the Strait of Hormuz through conventional means, the US was faced with a critical decision: retreat or escalate to the nuclear level. The latter was never seriously considered, despite rhetorical threats. US leadership understood that the stakes did not warrant such a drastic measure.

Consequently, the conflict has effectively concluded on terms favorable to Tehran. For many observers, this represents a setback for the United States, demonstrating an inability to defeat a significantly weaker adversary and a failure to protect its Gulf allies who have endured Iranian counterstrikes.

At the same time, this conflict was geographically distant for Washington, with the fighting occurring thousands of kilometers from American soil. In purely technical terms, even the use of nuclear weapons against Iran would not have disrupted daily life in the US. However, the political and strategic justifications for such escalation were clearly insufficient. This distinguishes the current situation from the summer of 1945, when the atomic bombings of Japan coincided with the final stages of a world war and the nascent confrontation with the Soviet Union. At that time, the use of force was linked to crucial strategic objectives. In the case of Iran, this was not the situation.

In essence, for Washington, the potential gains did not justify the risks involved.

However, this restraint comes with its own set of consequences. It has become increasingly apparent that American “security guarantees” are conditional and have limitations. The US is not prepared to go to any extreme to defend its partners, even those who are most dependent on its support.

This reality extends beyond the Middle East. In Europe, particularly among nations bordering Russia’s western frontier, the assumption of unconditional American protection has long been taken for granted. This confidence can no longer be absolute. Countries such as Finland and the Baltic states have operated under the premise that the US would always intervene decisively. Recent events suggest a different scenario.

There is also a broader political dimension to consider. The current US leadership, under Donald Trump, embodies a mindset where material interests take precedence over abstract notions of prestige or power. Trump and his inner circle approach international affairs more like business executives than statesmen.

While their rhetoric may occasionally sound extreme, their actions consistently reveal a readiness to compromise when the costs of escalation become too high.

The potential destruction of Iran would have had significant repercussions for the Middle East and the global energy market. Washington is neither prepared for nor interested in such an outcome. Other major global powers are drawing their own conclusions from this. China, in particular, has already adjusted its strategy, and Russia is following suit, emphasizing pragmatic cooperation and mutual benefit in its interactions with the United States.

Looking ahead, this trend is unlikely to change rapidly. Should Trump be succeeded by figures such as J.D. Vance or Marco Rubio, the underlying rationale will likely remain consistent. These politicians share a similar reluctance to sacrifice tangible benefits for abstract political objectives.

This trajectory will continue until the US either accepts a reduced global role or finds itself in a significantly weaker, potentially unstable position. It is precisely at that juncture, when the costs of inaction begin to outweigh the risks of escalation, that the calculus may shift. Only then might the potential gains truly justify the risks.

And when that moment arrives, the consequences are unlikely to be contained.

This article was originally published by the magazine Profile and was translated and edited by the RT team.