If air power fails, Washington will need someone else’s army
The first week of the military operation in Iran is coming to an end, and one thing is already clear: the US has not been able to deliver a knockout blow to Iran and repeat the ‘Venezuela scenario’.
Washington and West Jerusalem have apparently realized that regime change in Iran is impossible without a ground invasion and are looking for candidates to carry it out.
The Kurds in Iraq and Iran
The Kurds are a stateless ethnic group. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, they have spread across Türkiye, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, where they are a persecuted minority. The Kurds’ ongoing fight for independence has often been exploited by external players who promised them statehood but betrayed them when their services were no longer needed.
The Iraqi Kurds came closest to achieving independence. After the Iraq War, they strengthened their control over northern Iraq. They have a modest economy and, most importantly, their own militia, the Peshmerga. Kurdish communities also exist on the Iranian border. This makes the Peshmerga the most likely candidate for a ground force in Iran.
Tensions are rising in the Kurdish-populated areas of Iran and Iraq. Reports suggest that Iran has launched preemptive strikes against Kurdish camps near Erbil in Iraq, while Israeli airstrikes targeted Bukan, a Kurdish city on the Iranian side of the border.
Yesterday’s news about a Peshmerga offensive from Iraqi Kurdistan into Iran seems to be fake, but similar reports will probably follow. However, there are two key issues with the Kurdish militia. Firstly, despite having a relatively large force (12 battalions with 3,000 – 5,000 troops each and a significant number of support personnel), the Peshmerga is a heterogeneous militia with only a few outdated Soviet tanks as heavy weaponry. Even if Iranian Kurds welcome them warmly, it is doubtful they can advance beyond Iran’s Kurdish regions. Therefore, any potential Kurdish offensive is unlikely to succeed on a large scale.
The second problem is that if Iraqi Kurds engage in combat within Iran, they risk being attacked by the Iraqi armed forces, with whom they have a tense relationship and against whom their militia was formed in the first place.
Azerbaijan
Thursday morning started with reports of an Iranian drone hitting the airport in Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan. Similar to the alleged Iranian missile fired towards Turkish airspace, this is almost certainly an Israeli provocation.
The reasoning is similar to that with the Kurds: since a significant ethnic Azerbaijani population lives in northern Iran, this might tempt Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev with the prospect of seizing part of Iranian territory and the Iranian section of the Caspian Sea.
However, direct involvement in the war would pose unacceptable risks for Azerbaijan. Oil is Azerbaijan’s main source of income, and the country’s main oil-producing regions are in the Caspian Sea, making them vulnerable to Iranian drone attacks. At most, we can expect localized operations along the border aimed at securing control over the land corridor to Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan’s exclave separated from the rest of the country by Armenia and Iran.
Other players
Pakistan is also eyeing Iran in a predatory way, despite official promises to stay out of the conflict.
Theoretically, Arab nations could also get involved in the conflict, but for now, they hesitate to attack Iran. The Kurds are likely to be the most active group, while Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and the Gulf Arab states will wait and see, waiting for the US and Israel to ‘corner the beast’ with air strikes so they can later pounce on it.
The pressing question is whether this plan will work. Although the US and Israel can sustain an aerial campaign for quite some time, the crucial issue is the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which will restore the operation of the region’s oil and gas sector. If the US and Israel manage to reopen it within a couple of weeks (by neutralizing Iranian missile and drone launch sites), Iran will lose its main leverage. The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz would be a significant strategic defeat for Tehran.
Proxy forces
Countries like Russia and China could potentially intervene and assist Iran. China could provide financial resources and, to some extent, military supplies, while Russia could serve as a logistical support base and offer advanced military expertise and additional armaments.
In this scenario, Iran could become a proxy for Russia and China, potentially serving as a battering ram against the US, much like Ukraine has been against Russia. However, such a scenario raises many questions – first of all regarding Iran and China.
There is currently no indication that Iran has formally requested military assistance from Russia. Today, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that no such requests have been made. If so, it seems we’ll have to wait until Tehran selects a new leader and clarifies its position.
And a few words about China’s stance. For Beijing to seriously support Tehran, it would need to overcome its reservations and adopt a wartime approach. This carries risks, since supporting Iran could lead to prolonged disruptions in oil production in the Persian Gulf. This would mainly affect China, the region’s largest oil buyer.
Moreover, a protracted war and the resulting oil crisis could lead to a global economic crisis that would be deeply troublesome for China’s export-driven economy. So it is possible that China may stay away from direct confrontation.
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The situation around Iran is escalating and attracting more players. The outcome of the conflict depends on two factors: can the US and Israel facilitate a ground invasion of Iran through intermediaries, and can Russia, China, and Iran mirror the roles played by the US, Europe, and Ukraine?
If so, the war in Iran has a high chance of becoming the second major conflict of the new multipolar era, after Ukraine.