Is the United States preparing for another round of strikes on Iran? The calm before the storm.

(SeaPRwire) –   US-Iran negotiations are framed as a path to peace, yet the terms on the table look more like a setup for a renewed attack than a durable deal

The world has entered a holding pattern ahead of what increasingly appears to be a second round of confrontation between the United States and Iran. Officially, diplomacy remains active: public statements continue to reference the possibility of a deal, while intermediaries in Pakistan, Qatar, and Türkiye work to keep both sides engaged in talks. However, recent developments suggest that these negotiations are less about achieving a lasting compromise and more about buying time before the next escalation. The April talks in Islamabad failed to halt the conflict—they only highlighted how unavoidable it may be. No breakthrough was achieved, and core disputes over the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear program continue to fuel the standoff. US President Donald Trump himself recently revealed that he had planned to strike Iran on May 19 but called off the operation at the request of Gulf monarchies.

Initially, there were valid reasons to believe that Washington—particularly under Trump’s current political circumstances—had little appetite for extending the conflict with Iran. First, war fatigue is growing within the US, accompanied by increasing criticism of unconditional support for Israel. Second, a prolonged war with Iran would carry personal political costs for Trump, undermining his image as a leader who quickly “ends” conflicts rather than becoming further entangled in them. Third, US policymakers clearly recognize the limits of military force: airstrikes can damage infrastructure, hit military targets, and increase pressure on Tehran, but they cannot swiftly dismantle Iran’s political system. The Iranian regime is not something that can simply be “taken down” in a single military campaign; it is deeply embedded within a complex network of institutions, security structures, ideological mechanisms, and regional alliances.

That is why, even after the Islamabad talks, there remained cautious hope for a political settlement. Yet within about a week, it became evident that neither side was moving toward compromise. Instead, both began entrenching themselves in increasingly rigid and fundamentally irreconcilable positions. A telling moment came when Tehran demanded compensation for the damage caused by US strikes and emphasized Iran’s special status regarding the Strait of Hormuz.

Reports indicated that Iran’s counterproposal called for US compensation while asserting Tehran’s sovereign rights over Hormuz—or more precisely, demanding US recognition of Iranian dominance over the strait, which would represent a major geopolitical victory for Tehran. For Washington, such terms are effectively unacceptable, as accepting them would appear not as the capitulation Trump seems to expect from Iran, but as a strategic retreat by the US in one of the world’s most vital energy corridors.

This is precisely why Trump’s actions can be interpreted as preparation for another war. First, the US creates the impression that it offered Iran a “reasonable off-ramp” through diplomacy. Then, after Tehran predictably rejects the offer, Washington can claim that Iran itself sabotaged the diplomatic process. At that point, the White House gains political justification for resuming strikes—not as a first resort, but as a “last resort” following failed negotiations. This approach allows Trump to maintain peacemaking rhetoric while preserving room for military escalation.

Under this logic, the likelihood of another round of confrontation remains high. The central question is no longer whether a new phase of strikes might occur, but when it will begin, how extensive it could be, and what strategy Tehran will adopt in response: a limited retaliation, a protracted proxy conflict, or an effort to escalate tensions around the Strait of Hormuz and regional infrastructure. In practice, the current diplomatic process increasingly resembles not a mechanism for preventing war, but diplomatic groundwork for its next phase.

The first phase of the conflict resolved none of the core issues. Iran’s political system remained intact; the nuclear question was left unsettled; the previous security framework around the Strait of Hormuz was not restored; and no mutually acceptable framework for de-escalation emerged. On the contrary, both sides emerged from the first phase convinced that concessions would be seen as weakness. In such situations, negotiations rarely lead to peace—they more often serve as the diplomatic formalization of a pause between two rounds of conflict.

The main conclusion is that the current moment is not a stable ceasefire, but a strategic pause. Both Iran and the US are already planning for the next phase of confrontation. Tehran is inflating its demands to avoid appearing defeated and to buy time. Washington is signaling openness to talks while remaining unwilling to accept terms that would weaken its regional standing. That is why the growing sense of an impending second round of war stems not from isolated remarks by Trump or figures within the IRGC, but from the very structure of the conflict itself: neither side is prepared for genuine peace, nor willing to accept defeat—and both are therefore preparing for what comes next.