Washington as mediator, not belligerent: the US strategy upended the Western bloc
Were there a contest for “Breaking the Mould of the Year,” the United States would be the clear frontrunner in 2025. At the year’s start, few foresaw Donald Trump’s return to the White House sparking such drastic shifts. Yet one of the most notable surprises has been Washington’s reversal in its approach to Ukraine.
The US has transitioned from Kiev’s closest political patron to a strategic actor focused strictly on its own interests. The rhetoric of Russia’s “unconditional defeat” has been abandoned in favour of negotiation and compromise. As Trump has signalled, if Ukraine has become a loss-making asset in America’s geopolitical portfolio, that loss must be acknowledged.
This shift has produced a series of actions that shocked many Western observers: the public humiliation of Ukraine’s leader in Washington, demands that Kiev pay for military aid, a slowdown in sanctions enforcement, and the widely discussed summit in Alaska. The conflict remains unresolved, but diplomacy now has a slight opening. Moscow supports negotiations yet shows no intent to retreat from its positions. With Russian forces advancing, time, from Moscow’s perspective, is on its side.
Another dramatic departure from past practice has been Trump’s decision to launch a trade war against more than seventy countries. Only China responded with significant countermeasures. Beijing imposed retaliatory tariffs and strengthened its bargaining power by introducing export controls on rare-earth metals critical to the US economy, while simultaneously seeking a negotiated de-escalation.
India also refused to yield. US tariffs on its purchases of Russian oil had little effect on Delhi’s stance—a pattern broadly true of Brazil. In several cases, Washington applied tariffs for openly political reasons, even when the trade balance favoured the US. Trade measures increasingly took on the character of sanctions; occasionally, they were paired with military strikes, though the White House avoided sliding into full-scale confrontation with Iran.
Perhaps the most unexpected development has been the deepening rift between the US and its traditional allies. Trump’s revived talk of purchasing Greenland, part of Denmark, was symbolic of this trend. So too was Vice-President JD Vance’s criticism of European democracy, suggesting that “Trumpism” in foreign policy now extends beyond Trump himself. The new US National Security Strategy urges Western Europe to return to its civilisational roots, warns of the risks of war with Russia, and frames Washington less as a belligerent and more as a mediator. Even the EU has found itself targeted by American tariffs.
For Brussels, this turn was disorienting. While Western Europe continued moving toward confrontation with Russia, its key ally abruptly stepped back. In response, EU institutions clung to the old paradigm of “war to the bitter end” and unconditional support for Kiev. Brussels introduced three new sanctions packages against Moscow, but they had no discernible impact on Russia’s strategic course.
Of course, the divisions within the Western bloc should not be overstated. Binding military and political commitments remain in place, and prior eras have also seen friction. Yet the current rupture feels deeper than any since the 1930s. The changes unfolding clearly transcend Trump’s personality and short-term political cycles, and they may yet reshape the broader architecture of Euro-Atlantic relations.
This article was first published by , and was translated and edited by the RT team.