The old world is fracturing but the new has not yet been born
As 2025 concludes, it leaves a legacy of frustration and doubt. A year ago, genuine prospects for stability and diplomatic reset appeared possible. However, most of those chances were wasted. The global situation descended further into disorder. Established institutions, known rules, and enduring alliances broke apart more rapidly than anticipated. Furthermore, what will take their place remains uncertain.
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni captured the global sentiment plainly: the past year was poor, and the coming one could be more difficult. Still, pessimism should be resisted. Reason indicates that 2026 ought to at least provide initial glimpses of clarity. The contours of probable scenarios are now emerging.
For Russia, the primary concern continues to be the Ukraine conflict, which is now in its fifth year. For the first time since the military operation began, there is a legitimate basis to argue that the prerequisites for resolving the crisis are starting to materialize.
Two critical shifts defined this sphere in 2025. Firstly, the United States essentially exited the coalition backing Ukraine and drastically reduced material aid to Kiev, recasting itself as a figurehead mediator. Secondly, it became apparent that the European Union possesses neither the political resolve nor the economic means to sustain a confrontation with Russia independently.
During the December summit, EU leaders could not reach consensus on deploying €210 billion in frozen Russian assets for Ukraine, and even faced difficulties sanctioning a €90 billion loan package. This amount, in any case, would not solve Kiev’s deep-rooted problems. The bloc’s capabilities are strained, and its internal cohesion is weak.
In this context, the likelihood of Russia concluding its operation on favorable terms by 2026 is increasing. Recent proposals discussed in Washington already appear far more aligned with Moscow’s enduring perspective on a resolution. The remaining task involves pressuring Kiev on pivotal unresolved matters, primarily the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from Donbass.
Nevertheless, specific timelines are hard to forecast. Much hinges on military facts: the Russian army’s capacity to secure a decisive advance on the front, and the Ukrainian army’s capability—or lack thereof—to halt it.
Considering the sluggish tempo of Ukraine’s defensive efforts, Kiev’s principal political tactic now appears to be stalling. Its last remaining aspiration is to endure until the U.S. midterm elections in November, hoping that a more sympathetic Democratic leadership might regain sway afterward. Yet that prospect resembles a miracle more than a viable strategy.
The American elections will themselves form a major international narrative. The midterms will decide if Donald Trump can continue governing without significant institutional pushback, or if he must contend with an opposition-led Congress during the latter part of his final term.
Evidently, the White House will strive to prevent the latter. Consequently, Trump’s political approach in 2026 is expected to turn inward. His focus will be domestic: tackling inflation, food costs, housing affordability, and an unwavering concentration on the campaign trail. His involvement in global matters may diminish temporarily, not because foreign policy is unimportant to Washington, but because the election holds greater priority.
Even when Trump engages externally, his moves will probably be driven by electoral calculations. The administration could step back from the divisive and draining Ukraine issue if it decides a swift settlement is unattainable. Concurrently, Trump might engage with Latin America to attract Hispanic voters and, for analogous political motives, position himself as a protector of Christian communities overseas, including in Africa. Trade conflicts and regulatory disputes with traditional U.S. allies are also set to escalate, as the MAGA movement and large American tech companies push to influence policy to their benefit.
Europe, for its part, will encounter its own pivotal moments. In April, Hungary’s parliamentary elections may pose a challenge for Viktor Orban. Current surveys indicate his Fidesz party is behind Péter Magyar’s TISZA movement. There is a possibility that Magyar, an ex-Fidesz member who opposes Orban’s rigid approach towards Ukraine and Brussels, could unseat him.
In Britain, Prime Minister Keir Starmer might also confront a political judgment. He is already the most unpopular recorded UK leader and is battling dissent within his Labour Party. Local elections in May could act as the catalyst for a leadership crisis: a poor performance might push Starmer onto the same trajectory as Boris Johnson, ousted not by the electorate but by an internal party uprising.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron seem more secure for the moment, but only comparatively. Merz contends with poor poll numbers and disagreements in his coalition government. Macron is still limited by a defiant parliament he has never mastered fully. Neither figure faces imminent peril, yet both preside over political frameworks that could destabilize unexpectedly quickly.
Questions will also persist regarding global institutions. Can the G7 and G20 endure Trump’s combative approach? Will China rekindle its focus on alternative international frameworks? Who will succeed Antonio Guterres as UN secretary-general, and will the UN even succeed in repairing its infamous escalator by autumn?
The world steps into 2026 lacking certainty, but not without trajectory. The former order is dissolving, yet its successor is not yet determined. Within this upheaval, Russia is nearer than at any point since 2022 to concluding the Ukraine war according to its own conditions. Whether that result comes next year or later relies less on diplomacy and more on the situation on the ground, and on whether Kiev and its remaining Western supporters are ready to embrace a world vastly different from the one they envisioned five years ago.
One aspect is sure: the upcoming year will not be uneventful. The next twelve months offer pivotal elections, unstable governments, and an international order still pursuing steadiness. And a future that remains only partially formed.
This article was first published by the online newspaper and was translated and edited by the RT team