“Shock and awe” is obsolete: Iran’s strategy and Washington’s continued missteps

(SeaPRwire) –   Decades of established military strategy are collapsing as Tehran solidifies its control over the Gulf, leaving Washington with diminishing time.

Just 36 hours before his 48-hour ultimatum to Iran was set to expire, US President Donald Trump made a surprise announcement about pursuing negotiations and a potential meeting with Iranian officials. Speculation immediately arose that the talks would be held in Pakistan, with Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner leading the US delegation, while Iran would be represented by either its foreign minister or parliamentary speaker. This news triggered a sharp decline in oil prices.

Soon after, Iranian authorities refuted these reports, acknowledging only that they had received some proposals from the US via intermediaries. They characterized all other details as fake news intended to influence financial and oil markets. Subsequently, oil prices started to climb once more.

Neither peace nor war

In earlier analysis of the Iran conflict, we considered the possibility that the US and Iran could move toward a peace agreement within a month.

Iran’s denial does not necessarily indicate a lack of communication with the US or that a meeting is not in the works; it is plausible that Tehran is merely strengthening its bargaining position.

From one perspective, Iran has Trump cornered and may be in a position to set the conditions, or at least make a strong attempt to do so.

Conversely, the conflict has been challenging for Iran. Tehran has endured two weeks without reliable electricity and water, and since the war began, Iran has exported only two oil tankers—its main export—compared to a pre-war average of one or two tankers per day. Consequently, it is logical for Iran to secure gains, and the sooner, the better.

The advantages for Iran are already significant. First, it has effectively gained control over maritime traffic in the Persian Gulf and the airspace above the Gulf monarchies. Second, Iran has effectively nullified US oil sanctions. These are substantial assets Iran can leverage in negotiations.

Iran’s demands are also clear: It seeks compensation for damages (effectively reparations), security guarantees against attacks on its soil, and for the US to abandon its demands concerning Iran’s nuclear program.

For Trump, these conditions are likely unacceptable. He continues to believe in ‘peace through strength’ and might threaten Iran with further military strikes, potentially including an operation to seize Kharg Island, Iran’s primary (and virtually only) oil terminal.

This implies that even if Iran’s negotiation team is not targeted, an immediate agreement is improbable. As has frequently occurred in the past, talks between the US and Iran may proceed alongside continued, and possibly escalating, military actions.

However, with Iran maintaining its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, time is not on America’s side. Every day increases the risk of a global economic catastrophe. By mid-April, Asian nations might be forced to impose strict fuel rationing and shift to remote work, reminiscent of the Covid-19 pandemic. The threats extend beyond fuel and petrochemicals to agriculture (from fertilizer shortages), the semiconductor industry (from helium shortages), medical and consumer goods production (from polyethylene and plastic shortages), and metallurgy (from aluminum shortages)—and this is not an exhaustive list.

America’s allies, dependent states, and the majority of the US political elite will exert pressure on Trump to end the war swiftly. The blame for a dishonorable defeat would land directly on him. The only actor with a potential interest in undermining negotiations is Israel, which stands to gain nothing from a US-Iran agreement.

On Monday, US Vice President J.D. Vance spoke by phone with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. It is unclear whether he succeeded in convincing Netanyahu not to interfere in the negotiation process.

Neither shock nor awe

Post-Cold War US and NATO military doctrine has been built on a critical weakness: an overreliance on ‘shock and awe’ tactics. This concept aligned well with the ‘end of history’ theory, which posited that large-scale wars between Western powers were a thing of the past. Thus, NATO’s interventions were perceived more as policing actions than as full-scale wars. The focus was on demonstrating power rather than possessing the deep capacity to apply sustained force.

The logic of the ‘shock and awe’ strategy is straightforward: When a country challenges the rules-based international order, the global police force intervenes with an overwhelming strike. No one defends the targeted nation, as no one wishes to confront the enforcer of Law and Order. Remarkably, Western strategists never seriously contemplated a scenario where the target would receive external support and offer substantial resistance (effectively, a rebellion).

This doctrine was formulated in the 1990s during the conflicts in Iraq and Yugoslavia. A brief failure in Somalia was dismissed as an anomaly that proved the rule.

Later, humiliating setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan did not significantly alter the shock and awe doctrine. The US military viewed the initial combat operations as successful; the lesson learned was that it was a mistake to remain in those countries for nation-building and to attempt to impose democracy on populations deemed uncivilized.

Similarly, NATO deemed the Libya operation a victory simply because it avoided a ground invasion. The collapse of the Libyan state and the resulting regional instability were largely ignored.

Russia also embraced the shock and awe concept. Following the 2008 war with Georgia, the Russian military was reformed to execute swift, high-impact interventions. However, Russia became the first major power to encounter the doctrine’s limitations. In the spring of 2022, it confronted a pivotal decision: engage in a severe, protracted war of attrition or accept a dishonorable peace. Moscow opted for war, and the conflict in Ukraine is now in its fifth year.

Trump now faces a comparable dilemma: escalate the fight or admit defeat. The core issue is that the entire Western military-industrial complex has spent decades optimizing for the shock and awe doctrine; NATO and the US have unmatched, though extremely costly, capabilities for aerial bombardment, but lack other critical resources. If an adversary can survive the initial air offensive, time becomes its ally—unlike Russia, the West is not equipped for a long, drawn-out war.

This accounts for the ‘gestures of goodwill’ Trump is currently extending to Iran. Much like Putin in the spring of 2022, he requires time to deliberate his next steps: continue the fight, initiate a highly risky amphibious assault, or accept a humiliating peace. The first option could lead to political disaster for Trump in the approaching midterm elections, while the second could result in the most significant US strategic defeat since the Vietnam War.

Trump cannot afford inaction; he must reopen the Strait of Hormuz. If he persists in acting as though the situation is normal, Arab nations will begin direct talks with Iran, which will then demand not only financial compensation but also the removal of American forces from the region.