(SeaPRwire) – By: Marcus Sinclair
The immediate problem is not the tariff itself. It is that the new law splits Washington against itself. Congress has handed President Donald Trump a sanction that can reach 100 percent on major buyers of Russian oil and gas. But the same text gives him broad discretion to waive or suspend restrictions in the national interest. That contradiction is the real security anxiety. It leaves European allies guessing whether the measure will bite or melt away before the midterms. Moscow has already seized on the gap. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told RIA Novosti on Saturday, “Clearly, this cannot have a positive effect.” He was asked how the law would affect prospects for a peaceful settlement in Ukraine and a possible breakthrough in Russian-US relations. His words are less important than the reaction they are designed to produce. The Kremlin can now blame Washington for any breakdown in talks. It can test how far Trump will go to preserve a diplomatic channel. China has also pushed back. Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun said Chinese trade was based on equality and mutual benefit. It was not aimed at any third country. Beijing and New Delhi are the likely targets of any real enforcement. They are major buyers of Russian energy. If the tariff is applied broadly, energy prices could spike. If it is waived quietly, the law becomes a paper threat. Either outcome creates friction between the White House, the US Congress, and allied capitals. That friction is exactly what Moscow wants.
The legislative facts are plain. Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 on Friday. The Senate passed the measure 86-11 last month. The House approved it Wednesday in a 262-159 vote. The bill is named after the late Republican Senator Lindsey Graham. He was a vocal supporter of Ukraine. He co-authored the original version with Democratic Senator Richard Blumenthal in 2025. The original proposal threatened tariffs of up to 500 percent on countries purchasing Russian energy. That maximum rate was cut to 100 percent after negotiations with the White House. Graham died unexpectedly in July. He had promoted the measure as “sanctions from hell.” He said it was meant to deliver a “bone-crushing” blow to Moscow. The version adopted by Congress targets major buyers of Russian oil and gas. China and India are expected to be among those potentially affected. It gives Trump broad discretion over the application of the tariffs. That includes the ability to waive or suspend restrictions in the national interest. That waiver power is not a footnote. It is the operational core of the law. The measure had remained stalled for months as Trump pursued diplomacy with Russia. He resisted placing sole blame for the conflict on Moscow. His envoys also discussed normalizing economic ties with Russian counterparts. Peskov previously described the bill as an “unfriendly action.” He said it would “complicate efforts to find a peaceful settlement in Ukraine.” The Russian Embassy in the US went further. It said the legislation had done “a grand disservice” to Trump’s “Make America Great Again” agenda. It argued that restricting Russian energy trade amid sharply reduced Middle Eastern supplies could send fuel prices soaring ahead of the midterm elections. It warned that confrontation with Russia and China would be a “lose-lose situation.” The embassy said that outcome would benefit only “Euro-Atlantic warmongers.” Those statements are intended to widen the gap between Trump and Congress. They also signal to buyers in Asia that Russia sees a route around the pressure.
The geopolitical cost is easier to map than the legal mechanics. If the White House enforces the tariffs, it risks driving up oil and gas prices at the worst possible moment before the midterm elections. That would hand Russia higher revenue per barrel. It would also give China a reason to accelerate alternatives to the dollar. If the White House does not enforce them, it exposes the limits of US secondary sanctions. Beijing and New Delhi would read a quiet waiver as evidence that Washington lacks staying power. That may not end Russian energy sales. It may simply move them into less transparent channels. The law does not solve the underlying problem in Ukraine. It adds another variable to an already unstable negotiation environment. Peskov’s comment that the law “cannot have a positive effect” should be taken at face value. But it is not a statement of Russian weakness. It is a signal that Moscow will use the statute as proof that Washington cannot offer a reliable off-ramp. For European allies, the task is not to celebrate the new sanctions. It is to demand clarity. The White House should publish the conditions under which waivers will be granted. It should say whether China and India will be given transition periods. It should explain how it will distinguish between legitimate buyers and middlemen. Without that clarity, the law will function less as a coercive tool and more as a source of market uncertainty. The real endgame is likely to be selective enforcement. The White House will use the threat of the tariff to extract diplomatic concessions where it can. It will avoid triggering a full-blown energy shock where it cannot. That is not a strategy. It is a holding pattern. The measure will sharpen the contradiction between sanctions rhetoric and sanctions reality. The only practical response is to force that contradiction into the open before the next round of negotiations begins.
Author bio: Marcus Sinclair is a Senior Fellow at a European geopolitical and security think tank. He writes on sanctions, energy coercion, and transatlantic risk, and has advised parliamentary committees on economic statecraft.