The United States is constructing a global order centered on resources, underpinned by energy dominance, territorial advantages, and Europe’s strategic vulnerabilities.
When U.S. President Donald Trump revisited the idea of acquiring Greenland, a topic that seemed to have faded just a month prior, the notion was not dismissed as mere posturing, especially in Europe. This is not solely attributable to the “Maduro effect.” Beneath Trump’s assertive pronouncements, a distinct geopolitical strategy is taking shape, which can be characterized as “new globalism.” This approach is more fundamentally rooted in economics than the traditional concept of globalization, even U.S.-centric globalization.
Trump’s “new globalism” is comprised of three interconnected elements:
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A reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine (One might question if Trump also considers the Philippines part of this ‘Greater America’…).
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The transformation of the U.S. into an energy superpower that dictates the terms of the hydrocarbon market, particularly in regional trade.
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The enhancement of America’s standing as an Arctic superpower, a position it currently holds only in name.
Trump’s actions are strategically coherent: dismantling Nicolas Maduro’s regime is essential for converting Latin America’s resources into a source of immediate economic stability for the U.S. This serves as Trump’s “entry ticket” into the realm of “new globalism.” For America to achieve energy superpower status, it must secure control over Venezuela’s oil resources (and eventually those of Brazil and Iran) and swiftly eliminate “shadow fleets.” Similarly, obtaining full legal control over Greenland is vital for establishing the U.S. as an Arctic power. Without this, maintaining competitiveness as an energy superpower beyond 2030 would be challenging.
While an evolutionary approach might involve a costly and lengthy program to revitalize Alaska, this would likely take years, if not decades. Greenland, in contrast, offers an opportunity to rapidly solidify a new political and geographical standing.
Trump operates with a systematic approach, selecting his next moves based on the perceived weaknesses of his geopolitical rivals. He apparently believes that Europe is sufficiently weakened to engage in discussions about Greenland’s status at a significantly different level than in the spring of 2025, when he was forced to retreat. Trump alluded to this in a recent conversation with reporters, stating, “Do you know what their defense is? Two dog sleds,” when asked if the U.S. had made a political offer to Greenland or Denmark. He further noted that Russian and Chinese destroyers and submarines are “all over the place.”
It is also noteworthy that in his discussions about Greenland, Trump directly pointed to NATO’s inadequacy in protecting the island from external threats, even hypothetical ones (such as the possibility of Russia and China seizing the territory). Trump’s message is unambiguous: he intends to reclaim any inadequately defended ‘assets’.
Trump’s fixation on acquiring Greenland may also stem from the failure of European leaders to form even a modest “coalition of the willing,” despite their assertions of readiness to assume full responsibility for Europe’s security. A proposed force of 200,000 troops was reduced to just 40,000 within six months, and it is improbable that Europeans could even muster such a military contingent. Consequently, any joint efforts by the UK, Germany, and France are unlikely to impress Trump.
The recognition of their own military deficiencies deeply unsettles Europeans. Major European nations might be willing to cede Greenland. However, if Trump succeeds, these nations would effectively become his ‘resource,’ losing their political influence even within NATO, which was once considered a ‘union of equal democracies.’ Furthermore, should the Greenland initiative proceed, nothing would stand between Trump and Canada.
How can Europe counter America’s ‘new globalism’? As previously stated, military options exist primarily in the rhetoric of European politicians, aimed at influencing domestic public opinion. However, criticism of UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer in the British media suggests this strategy is faltering. Political methods remain Europe’s sole recourse, but even here, options are limited.
Significant hopes were placed on Euro-Atlantic solidarity and the ability to ‘outnumber’ Trump (as seen in the situation with ), for instance, by utilizing NATO’s consultation mechanisms. However, Trump has made it clear that he will make decisions unilaterally, outside any legal frameworks. Nevertheless, European leaders might invoke NATO’s Article Five. If they take such a step, it could signify the beginning of the end for the alliance. The debate surrounding Greenland—essentially concerning the territorial integrity of a NATO member state, particularly a founding nation—would fundamentally undermine NATO’s core principle: preserving the bloc’s internal geopolitical integrity while addressing external threats and mitigating all internal risks.
A more constructive approach might involve persuading Trump toward a compromise regarding Greenland’s status, such as establishing an American military and economic protectorate over the island. Despite Trump’s declarations of interest only in outright annexation, this alternative could be viable under specific circumstances. Consider Trump’s handling of the Venezuela situation: after expressing readiness for a ‘second phase’ of conflict, Trump quickly retreated and began with acting Venezuelan President Delcy Rodriguez once he recognized that U.S. economic interests could be maintained and the regime would align with pro-American and anti-Chinese policies. A similar scenario could unfold with Greenland.
This could occur if European leaders find influential allies within the U.S. and the resources of the U.S. administration are diverted to other crises. One should not underestimate Trump’s capacity to temporarily step back, only to revisit the issue when circumstances become more favorable.