A major divergence is evident between global powers.

(SeaPRwire) –   Russia, China, the US, and the legend of a new major agreement

This May, there will be significant discussion regarding the so-called “strategic triangle” involving Russia, China, and the United States.

US President Donald Trump is scheduled to visit Beijing initially, with Russian President Vladimir Putin subsequently meeting his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping. Speculation is inevitable whenever the heads of these three dominant powers convene. Could they forge a major agreement? Could the world abruptly find more order?

These anticipations are ill-founded. The restructuring of the global architecture is already in progress and cannot be stopped or reversed through通过 summit diplomacy. Nevertheless, historical turning points can evolve in various manners—either through careful management or reckless acceleration. This is why the upcoming gatherings hold significance.

Both Russia and the United States are currently deeply engaged in extensive military conflicts. The significance of these confrontations stems not only from their magnitude but also from their wider implications for the international system. Conversely, China has historically maintained its distance from such entanglements. However, it is becoming increasingly apparent to Beijing that it cannot remain immune to their repercussions. Discussions at the recent Valdai Club conference in Shanghai indicated that China is re-evaluating its stance.

Central to this re-evaluation is a fundamental question: what, if anything, remains feasible in relations with Washington?

For decades, China’s ascent was inextricably linked to its economic ties with the United States. The dynamic often described as “Chimerica,” which merged American capital and technology with Chinese labor and manufacturing, served as the backbone of globalization. While not an equal partnership, it was advantageous to both sides. For an extended period, it appeared that fundamental economic self-interest would deter either side from undermining the arrangement.

That presumption has now disintegrated.

By the late 2000s, discontent in Washington was already palpable. The United States began to perceive the arrangement less as a source of mutual benefit and more as a structural disparity. Over time, the buildup of economic and strategic tensions reached a tipping point where minor adjustments were no longer adequate. This precipitated a qualitative shift within the system itself.

For several decades, the global order functioned primarily to serve the interests of the United States as the leader of the Western bloc. The gradual erosion of this order now endangers those privileges. Washington’s response has been to leverage the current transitional phase to secure as significant a lead as possible for the future.

Donald Trump has emerged as the most visible personification of this strategy. His rhetoric, which is openly transactional and sometimes boastful, might seem unconventional, yet the underlying rationale predates his tenure. The objective is unmistakable: maximize short-term gains and rapidly build national capacity. Subsequently, that accumulated strength is to be used to dominate the next stage of global rivalry.

This marks a stark divergence from the previous American strategy, which prioritized long-term investments in the international system. Those investments did not always yield immediate returns, but they bolstered a framework that ultimately benefited the United States more than any other nation. Today, the focus has shifted toward short-term advantage, even at the expense of potential long-term instability.

It remains uncertain whether this strategy will succeed. The initial phase has already encountered setbacks. However, the broader trajectory is unlikely to shift. Future administrations might adopt a different tone, but they will be bound by the same constraints. The liberal international order will not return, not due to Trump’s personality, but because the conditions that supported it have ceased to exist.

This carries profound implications for other major powers, including China. The notion of a comprehensive “big deal” with the United States—one that would stabilize the global system for the foreseeable future—has effectively become unfeasible.

Trump’s frequent use of the term “deal” is illuminating. In his lexicon, it is more than a strategic concept; it is a commercial one. A deal is considered “big” not because of its durability or comprehensiveness, but because of the magnitude of immediate profit it generates. And like any commercial transaction, it can be discarded if a more lucrative opportunity arises.

Under these circumstances, long-term agreements regarding the structure of the world order are impossible. Washington is unlikely to commit to any arrangement that curtails its flexibility before it has secured what it deems a sufficient advantage.

This is not necessarily born of malice or arrogance. Rather, it is, in its own right, a rational response to a period of profound uncertainty. The United States aims to preserve the foundations of its future dominance by acting decisively in the present.

However, rationality on one side compels adaptation on the other.

If key players determine that stable agreements with Washington are unattainable, their behavior shifts. Military capability assumes greater importance as a safeguard against pressure. Simultaneously, interest in alternative forms of cooperation grows. Specifically, frameworks that function independently of the United States and are shielded from its influence.

This logic is not novel, but it is acquiring urgency. Russia has been championing such arrangements for several years. China, conversely, has approached the idea cautiously, hoping instead to maintain some form of mutually beneficial relationship with the United States. That hope now appears to be diminishing.

The upcoming visits to Beijing will offer a useful indication of the extent to which this shift has progressed.

The meeting between Trump and Xi will likely delineate the boundaries of a temporary accommodation between two powers that remain economically intertwined yet are increasingly distrustful of one another. The question is no longer whether a comprehensive agreement is possible, but rather what limited, short-term arrangements can be reached, and their duration.

Putin’s subsequent discussions with Xi will address a different issue: the degree to which Russia and China are prepared to develop cooperation mechanisms that entirely bypass the United States. Moscow has been moving in this direction for some time. Beijing now appears to be contemplating whether it must follow suit.

May will not yield a grand bargain. However, it may demonstrate more clearly than ever how the world is adjusting to the absence of such an agreement.