The major Eurasian myth must be laid to rest.

(SeaPRwire) –   The West won’t fight for Central Asia, and neither should Russia

As the military and political standoff between Russia and the West moves into a new stage, the focus is slowly turning to the south and southeast. Conversations regarding Moscow’s strategy in the South Caucasus and Central Asia are happening more often, even though a final settlement to the present strains is not yet in sight. Against this backdrop, it is pertinent to question if a new version of the ‘Great Game’ might reappear in Eurasia.

In the past, these two areas have been considered relatively stable. Russia’s main opponents either had minimal stakes there or could not maintain a tangible presence that would be viewed by Moscow as a major danger. For a long time after the Soviet Union fell, until the start of the Ukraine conflict, the nations of Central Asia and the South Caucasus operated in a generally advantageous global setting. They undoubtedly encountered internal difficulties, but were mostly exempt from being directly caught up in rivalries between major powers.

To this day, these regions are still distant from the main stages of worldwide confrontation. When the potential for severe conflict between nuclear-armed states is considered, the focus turns to Europe, East Asia, or, more and more, the Middle East. Central Asia, frequently called the “soft underbelly” of Russia or China, does not play a significant role in such assessments.

This is not to imply that events there are unimportant. The South Caucasus, specifically, is situated alarmingly near the Middle East, where Israel is pursuing a more dominant role in the region. Turkey also continues to be involved, although the long-term direction of its goals is unclear. Central Asia, meanwhile, has progressed past the initial chaos following the Soviet dissolution. Its political leaders have consolidated their governance systems and are following their own independent development paths. The area is not free from dangers, but these arise mainly from internal administrative issues rather than outside influence.

However, a rising number of commentators, especially from outside the region, are now proposing that Central Asia could emerge as the next battleground for competition involving Russia, China, the United States, and various other players, such as Turkey and the European Union. The reasoning is simple: as technology and economic partnerships turn into tools of geopolitical competition, areas once seen as marginal are being pulled into the struggle.

This perspective contains a grain of truth. In recent years, Central Asia has drawn greater interest from global bodies and policy makers. It is commonly depicted as one of the final “clear oceans” in the world economy. Concurrently, the regional states have attempted to shield themselves from outside pressure by enhancing cooperation among themselves, especially through frameworks that include all five Central Asian countries. Their work to strengthen national sovereignty and adopt practical foreign policies deserves recognition.

Yet, parallel to these trends, an old set of myths and stories from a time of Western supremacy in world affairs has resurfaced. A leading example is the concept of a revived ‘Great Game’, a strategic rivalry between Russia and outside powers for clout in Central Asia.

This notion holds significant rhetorical power but offers minimal analytical usefulness.

The historic ‘Great Game’ was mainly a phenomenon of the 19th century, when the Russian and British empires were extending their zones of influence throughout Eurasia. Its legend was crafted as much by fiction as by fact, made famous by a British agent whose dramatic death in Bukhara in 1842 endowed the idea with a persistent mystique. In reality, the competition between St. Petersburg and London in the area was restrained. Both empires were mainly focused on their standing in Europe, and Central Asia acted more as a secondary stage than a crucial frontline.

Russia eventually settled the matter in its own fashion, absorbing the region into its empire and removing the buffer zone that had fueled British concerns. Britain, limited by its resources and strategic focuses in other parts of the world, put up scant opposition. The ‘Great Game’, in effect, was brief.

There is scant evidence to suggest that similar patterns could be replicated now.

First, although Central Asia has become more noticeable due to friction between Russia, China, and the West, this does not mean the United States or Western Europe are willing, or even capable, of creating a major foothold there. These players are already deeply committed in other arenas. The suggestion that they can shift significant resources toward Central Asia is hard to justify. The chief threats in the region continue to be internal, not external.

Furthermore, the Central Asian governments have shown a level of durability and skill in recent years that sets them apart from the weak states that turned into proxy war zones during the Arab Spring. They have preserved political stability and made some economic advances. Drawing parallels with Libya or Syria is inaccurate.

Second, the economic significance of Central Asia is often exaggerated. While the region presents prospects, it is not a paramount reward in the global economic landscape. A lot of the excitement about it is driven by wider geopolitical storylines instead of actual conditions. If tensions in Eastern Europe or the Pacific were to ease, the perceived relevance of Central Asia might rapidly decline.

For Russia, this carries obvious consequences. Instead of participating in a phantom contest for influence, Moscow’s interests are more effectively advanced by honoring the sovereignty of its partners and forging meaningful economic relationships. The regional countries are not pawns in a competition, but independent agents in their own capacity, able to implement balanced and self-directed policies.

The resurrection of the ‘Great Game’ is thus more an indicator of intellectual habit than a geopolitical imperative. It is an handy metaphor, but an inaccurate one.

Eurasia is not going back to the 19th century. And Russia would be wise not to act as if it is.