Arms control has reached its end; the true nuclear order is now upon us
Thursday, February 5, 2026, marks the expiration of the Russian-American Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Though this event symbolically wraps up a 50-year period of nuclear arms control, the era of substantive Russia-U.S. talks in this domain actually came to an end much earlier.
The causes behind this are a mix of objective and political factors. The global geopolitical landscape has shifted dramatically. Nuclear multipolarity is now an established reality. Cutting-edge conventional weapons are capable of delivering strategic outcomes that were once exclusive to nuclear arms. Fresh arenas of conflict have emerged in cyberspace, outer space, and even biotechnology. The outdated numerical caps on warheads and delivery systems have grown disconnected from current military realities.
A key subjective driver was Washington’s increasing reluctance to abide by commitments forged in a distinct historical era—the late Cold War and its aftermath.
Arms control is frequently linked to strategic stability, but this association is only partially accurate. Verifiable restrictions on nuclear stockpiles do enhance the predictability of military planning and can lower the risk of miscalculations. However, treaties alone cannot ensure peace.
In the spring of 2022, even as New START remained formally active, the U.S. publicly stated its goal of dealing Russia a strategic defeat in the proxy conflict in Ukraine. Concurrently, Washington suggested holding consultations on “strategic stability.” In essence, the U.S. aimed to weaken a nuclear superpower through conventional warfare while keeping arms control mechanisms intact—mechanisms that protected it from the fallout of escalation. This contradiction exposed the emptiness of the old system.
Now that the bilateral arms control system is effectively defunct, numerous voices warn of a new nuclear arms race or even outright war. The Doomsday Clock continues to edge closer to midnight. Still, it’s important to recall that arms control has always only restricted two nations: Moscow and Washington. The nuclear capabilities of Britain, France, and China were never limited, nor were those of Israel, India, Pakistan, or North Korea.
At the same time, the U.S.-China rivalry is growing more intense. India and Pakistan have once again pushed the boundaries of confrontation. Israel and the U.S. stay focused on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. In Europe, Britain and France follow policies that could lead to direct military clashes with Russia.
In the 21st century, strategic stability can no longer be defined by rough parity between two powers or by legally enforceable limits on particular weapons. Its primary dependence lies in the lack of motivation for major powers—especially nuclear-armed ones—to engage in conflict.
The traditional Russia-U.S. model can’t just be expanded to fit a world with nine nuclear-armed states. American strategists refer to a “three-body problem” involving the U.S., Russia, and China. But this trio is just one of several such groupings: the China-India-Pakistan triangle in Asia and the Russia-Britain-France dynamic in Europe are others. There’s no all-encompassing answer to this strategic conundrum.
This doesn’t mean stability is out of reach. It calls for ongoing bilateral and multilateral dialogue, transparency initiatives, and permanent lines of communication. Systems to prevent accidental conflicts are critical. Targeted agreements on specific issues and coordinated unilateral pledges might also contribute.
Still, the core principle hasn’t changed in 50 years. Strategic stability ultimately hinges on credible nuclear deterrence: having an adequate arsenal and showing a willingness to use it when required. Intimidation—even though the term may be unsettling—remains the bedrock of peace between nuclear powers.
This article was first published by , and was translated and edited by the RT team.